BRONSTER LLP

Of Counsel
156 W 56th Street, Suite 703, New York, NY 10019
T. 347-246-4888
jtangel@bronsterllp.com

John M. Tangel is Of Counsel to the Firm’s Tax Lien & Mortgage Foreclosure Practice Group. His practice focuses on commercial and residential mortgage foreclosure litigation. He represents tax lien servicers, financial institutions, hedge fund managers, and private lenders through every aspect of the foreclosure process in supreme and appellate courts.

For over 30 years, Mr. Tangel has primarily represented institutional lenders, hedge fund managers and private lenders in mortgage foreclosure and other related litigation and in connection with loan purchase agreements. He has successfully represented lenders facing bar claim and quiet title actions founded upon allegations of usury or the six-year statute of limitations.

In his spare time, John enjoys playing lacrosse. He was previously the team captain of the Southampton College Men’s NCAA Lacrosse Team and received several outstanding athlete awards.

Representative Cases:

GMAC Mortg. Corp. v Tuck, 299 A.D.2d 315, 750 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dept. 2002) - Successfully defended Appeal by Borrower’s Estate to set aside foreclosure sale, vacate judgment, and dismiss action for lack of personal jurisdiction upon showing the Estate Administrator was properly served in the action. This case is frequently cited in the Appellate Division in support of the rule that a borrower’s estate representative may be personally served as “Jane Doe” and substituted as a defendant in the action without the necessity of service of a supplemental summons and amended complaint. This case is even more frequently cited in the Appellate Division in support of the rule that a borrower’s right of redemption is not permitted after a foreclosure sale, whether or not a deed has actually been delivered to the sale purchaser.

Exeter Holding, LTD v Geithner, Putnam County Supreme Court Index No. 223/2011 – Successfully obtained summary judgment and subsequently foreclosed an otherwise unenforceable usurious Mortgage Note pursuant to the Doctrine of Equitable Assignment by Subrogation.

Onewest Bank FSB v. PSP–NC, LLC, 181 A.D.3d 692, 121 N.Y.S.3d 288 (2d Dept., 2020) – Successfully defended Appeal brought by subordinate mortgagee in their Quite Title action seeking to cancel and discharge mortgage pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations upon showing that the subordinate mortgagee failed to establish that commencement of a prior foreclosure action in August 2006 accelerated the mortgage such that the six-year statute of limitations then began to run.   This case has been cited in many subsequent Appellate Division cases.

BHMPW Funding, LLV v Lloyd-Lewis, 194 A.D.3d 780, 149 N.Y.S.3d 141 (2d Dept., 2021) – Successfully defended an appeal brought by Borrower’s Estate seeking to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale and dismiss the action as being time barred pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations upon grounds that the mortgage debt was accelerated by a prior foreclosure action which was dismissed for lack of standing upon showing the debt was never validly accelerated by the prior foreclosure action complaint. This case has been cited numerous times in the Appellate Division in support of the rule that a Plaintiff without standing to commence an action is equally without standing to accelerate the debt.

Bank of New York Mellon v. McCaffrey, 207 A.D.3d 614, 172 N.Y.S.3d 78 (2d Dept., 2022) – In a defensive action, successfully Appealed and set aside Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale and Order of Reference in Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Action upon showing that Plaintiff failed to establish prima facie proof of service of proper RPAPL 1303 90-Day Notices. This case has been cited multiple times in subsequent Appellate Division cases.

Sansone v. North Shore Investors Realty Group, LLC, 218 A.D.3d 698, 192 N.Y.S.3d 663 (2d Dept., 2023)  Successfully appealed judgment cancelling and discharging mortgage of record in Borrower’s quiet title action upon showing that  Mortgagee's notice of intent to foreclose did not constitute clear and unequivocal notice of acceleration of mortgage debt and therefore, the six-year statute of limitations  had not expired.  This case has been cited several times in the Appellate Division.